

GUARDING PROFITS NOT LIVES

THE BURMA ARMY'S ROLE IN THE DEADLY GWIHKA LANDSLIDE



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Summary

On July 2, 2020, about 300 mine workers died in a deadly landslide at a jade mine at Gwihka in Hpakant, Kachin State. The casualties were all jade scavengers, working in a mine that was officially closed for the rainy season.

Most media reports have blamed the disaster on poor law enforcement, and on the greed of mining companies, who flouted environmental protection and safety laws, letting their mines become giant death traps. The Union Minister for Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Ohn Win placed blame on the victims themselves, for their “greed,” while State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi blamed the tragedy on joblessness, which drove the scavengers to work “illegally.”

There has been little focus on the Burma Army’s role in the tragedy, beyond mention of their beneficial ownership of many of the jade companies. Indeed, one of the three main companies operating in the Gwihka Mine was the military-owned Yadana Kye, which was using dynamite and heavy machinery to keep digging right until June 25 – when the mine was officially closed for the rainy season – despite clear signs of instability at the 1,000-foot-high edges of the open pit mine.

But the Burma Army bears responsibility for the disaster in a more direct way. For the Gwihka Mine, like the rest of the Hpakant jade mining area, is under tight control of the government military. Their troops guard all the mining sites, and should have ensured that the unstable Gwihka Mine was out of bounds. The troops did not seal off the mine for the simple reason that their function was not to secure lives, but to secure profits from the jade extracted – in this case by the scavengers, from whom the military automatically receive a share of profits from any jade found.

The highly lucrative “taxing” of manually scavenged jade is a sizable revenue source for the military, shared up to the highest levels, and collected in cash by troops on the ground -- currently the notoriously brutal Infantry Division 33, posted to Hpakant after committing mass atrocities in northern Rakhine in 2017.


For jade scavenging is not, as it appears, an informal free-for-all, but a tightly controlled enterprise, with the main profits going to companies and the military, and only small earnings going to the scavengers themselves.

Scavenging is at the bottom rung of the exploitative supply chain of the jade mining industry, whereby the free labour -- and often life -- of the scavengers is used to extract the very last ounce of value from the mines.

The Burma Army's tentacles of control over every level of the jade mining industry are the reason why it is impossible to improve mining conditions without radical structural political reform. Attempts to improve regulation of the mining industry will fail while the Burma Army remains all powerful, with their own troops guarding the mining sites.

KWAT therefore calls urgently for a withdrawal of Burma Army troops from all ethnic areas, including Hpakan, so that inclusive political dialogue towards a new federal democratic constitution, including security sector reform, can begin.

KWAT also calls for a moratorium on all mechanized mining and other large-scale resource extraction projects in ethnic areas until there is genuine peace and devolution of power under a new federal constitution -- giving local people control of their lands and natural resources, under the protection of a locally accountable security apparatus.



Location of Gwihka in Kachin State

Background of the Gwihka jade mining area

Gwihka town lies about 10 miles south of Hpakant. Before mechanized jade mining began in Gwihka about 40 years ago, it was a village of only about 300 Kachin and Shan households, who were mainly subsistence farmers. In former times, the centuries-old village was ruled by a Kachin chief (duwa), of the Jeng Reng clan.

The original landscape of Gwihka was densely forested mountains, teeming with wildlife. The name “Gwihka” means “dog-footprint” (gwe hkan) in Kachin, but actually refers to footprints of tigers, seen around the village, but called “dog-prints” to allay villagers’ fears.

After the 1994 ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burmese military regime, mechanized jade mining began in the Hpakant area, including Gwihka, and migrants started arriving from other areas to work in the jade mines. After 2010, mining became even more intensive, with larger machines, and numbers of mine workers swelled.

The landscape of Gwihka changed dramatically. The mountains were stripped and gutted. Forests and wildlife disappeared. The Gwihka stream was blocked by mining waste, causing damaging floods.

By 2010, Gwihka had expanded into about 4,000 houses, spread over several villages or “blocks”, next to the mining sites.

The largest mining site, the “Gwihka Mine,” where the July 2 landslide occurred, lies southwest of the town. This former mountainous area, the site of the “Eden Prayer Hill,” where a giant cross stood, has become a vast 1,000-foot-deep crater.

There have already been two large landslides causing loss of life in the Gwihka Mine: on December 12, 2016, a landslide killed 20 people, and on May 4, 2018, about 100 people were buried in a landslide, but only three bodies recovered.



This bridge used to span the Gwihka Stream, which has now dried up due to mining

Companies operating at the Gwihka Mine

The Gwihka Mine is divided into hundreds of plots, mostly one acre in size. Most of the mining permits for these plots were granted under the government of U Thein Sein, and have already expired.

According to an official list of mining permits obtained in 2018, seventeen companies had permits to mine in the Gwihka area in 2020. Half of these permits expired in or before June 2020. (See Appendix for list of companies.)

Local people say that there were three main companies operating at the Gwihka Mine in June 2020, which were Yadana Kye, Ayeyar Yadana and 111 Company. All three companies had continued working throughout the Covid-19 lockdown.

Yadana Kye had permits for nine one-acre plots in the Gwihka Mine, which expired on June 11, 2020.

Ayeyar Yadana had permits for nine one-acre plots in Gwihka, one of which expired in January and four in June 2020, while one will expire in October and three in December, 2020.

111 did not have any permits under its own name, but Ne Kya Yadana, a company under 111, had a permit for one plot, which expired in October 2020.

Yadana Kye is directly associated with the Burma Army. It is under Myanmar Thura Gems, well-known to be military-owned.

On the day of the disaster, the website of the Burma Army Commander in Chief named Yadana Kye company in connection to the incident, but mentioned that it had already suspended work:


“A terrible landslide happened from the place with an earthen crack about 500 feet high at the mining site of Yadana Kyei Company near Whaykha Village, Seikmu Villagetract in Hpakant Township in Kachin State at about 7.45 am today. As such, loose soil fell into the lake in the block of the suspended company, causing waves which hit traditional jade miners. In the incident, traditional jade miners went missing and floating in the waves.”¹

An article in the New Light of Myanmar on July 6 reporting on a visit by government officials to the disaster site mentioned only one private company accompanying the group, which was Myanmar Thura Gems. The same article reported that Myanmar Thura

¹<http://cincds.gov.mm/node/8186>

Gems - together with the Myanmar Gems and Jewelry Entrepreneurs Association -- provided compensation to victims of the disaster.

Myanmar Thura Gems was operating at the site of another major landslide in Hpakant which occurred on April 22, 2019, killing over 50 mine workers.



Companies with permits to mine in Gwihka in 2020, and location of permitted blocks

Security in the Gwihka area

Before the 1994 ceasefire, most of the Hpakant area was under the control of the KIA's 6th Battalion, originally headquartered at Gwihka, but later at Ginsi, north of Hpakant. When the ceasefire was broken in June 2011, the Burma Army launched fierce offensives against the KIA to seize control of the jade mines, and progressively seized KIA camps around Hpakant, until finally in 2015, they overran the KIA's 6th Battalion headquarters in Ginsi and drove KIA out of the mining areas.

The fighting displaced several thousand villagers, many of whom remain in IDP camps, fearful of returning to their original homes for fear of the Burma Army. Military abuses in Hpakant included the fatal shooting of 14-year-old schoolgirl Ja Seng Inn by troops of LIB 389 on September 12, 2012. When her father wrote a letter of complaint to the Myanmar Human Rights Commission accusing government troops of killing her, he ended up being imprisoned for two years under Penal Code Article 211 – for “false” accusations against the military.



Location of Burma Army camp in Gwihka

Since seizing control of Hpakant, the Burma Army has deployed entire elite infantry divisions to secure the area. The usual function of these elite divisions is to reinforce locally based troops during counter-insurgency operations. But in Hpakant, where there has been no major fighting for several years, their main purpose is clearly to provide security

for the extraction of jade -- and protect the reputation of the army. In 2018, when local activists distributed leaflets in Hpakant citing human rights violations by the Burma Army, a Kachin community leader was sued for defamation by the locally stationed military commander from Infantry Division 101.

Since May 2018, the notoriously brutal Infantry Division 33, comprising ten infantry battalions, has been stationed in Hpakant (replacing Infantry Division 101). Most well-known for mass atrocities -- including systematic rape -- against the Rohingya in 2017, ID 33 is also notorious for crimes against civilians in Kachin areas, after the resumption of fighting with the KIA in 2011.

The ID 33 division commander is based in Hpakant, overseeing the battalions stationed around the area, including at Gwihka. These crack troops are assigned to guard the mining sites, together with special combat police, who are directly under military control. The combat police were deployed to Hpakant about six years ago, and are present in most mining sites, but not in Gwihka, where only the military takes charge of security, likely because of Gwihka's more isolated location.

The commander in charge of the Gwihka military camp at the time of the disaster was called Zaya Nyo.

Military “taxing” of jade scavengers

Although the Burma Army troops in Hpakant should be protecting the safety and lives of the local residents, their actual function is to secure the mines against “theft” of jade -- i.e. into pockets from which they cannot receive a share. This not only means protecting jade dug up mechanically by companies (who pay regular fees to the local military), but also overseeing the jade scavenging process, to ensure they get their cut from jade nuggets found in the mining debris.

This “taxing” of jade scavengers provides a substantial source of income for the military. It is common knowledge that Napyidaw military elites benefit from shares in the jade companies, earning huge sums from the jade which is mechanically extracted (Global Witness estimated the annual value of the jade industry in 2014 was 31 billion US dollars)². It is less well-known that the military are also squeezing the last ounce of profit from the jade mines by taxing jade which is manually scavenged, both during and outside the official mining season.

The scavenging business is tightly controlled. Whenever a piece of jade is found, it is brought immediately to a local dealer near the site, who assesses the value and pays

²Myanmar's Big State Secret, Global Witness, October 2015

for the stone – unless it is very valuable, in which case the company (operating the mine) seizes the stone immediately, and the scavenger gets nothing. If a dealer buys a stone, the scavenger only gets a fraction of the amount paid, which is mostly shared between the scavenger’s boss (“laopan”), the company operating the mining site, and the military. The money, paid in cash to local troops, is shared back up to commanders at different levels, including the Northern Regional Commander.

The military’s direct profits from the scavengers is why they made no attempt to block off the Gwihka Mine after the rains began, despite the clear signs that it was unstable.



Burma Army troops guarding a jade mine entrance while scavengers wait to enter at the permitted time


The unfolding of the disaster

Each of the main companies working in the Gwihka Mine in the months preceding the disaster -- Yadana Kye, Ayeyar Yadana and 111 -- had hundreds of giant dump trucks and backhoes. They also used dynamite to blast the mountainside, creating sheer 1,000-foot high cliffs at the edges of the mine.

While the companies were working, troops of ID 33 were stationed at the main entrance to the mine, to ensure no unauthorized entry. In the mornings between 4 and 6 am, and in the evenings between 4 and 6 pm, scavengers were allowed into the mine to search among the debris. Their entrance to and from the mine was tightly monitored. All jade collected by the scavengers had to be immediately valued and sold to dealers near the entrance to the mine, with the military's share handed over directly in cash.

Cracks began appearing at the northern edge of the mine in early June. Local headmen went to inspect the area on June 3, and found there were no warning signboards near the cliff edge, or anywhere around the mine. (Warning signs pictured later in media reports were only put up after the disaster.)

Despite the signs of instability at the edge of the mine, the companies continued excavating at full capacity and using dynamite until June 25, when the mine officially shut for the rainy season. On June 27, the companies withdrew their machinery from the mine.



Map showing how the July 2, 2020, disaster unfolded (using a Google Earth image from December 2018 before the latest mine expansion)

When the company stopped working, the military stopped regulating the scavengers' entry to the mine. The scavengers were allowed to enter and forage in the mine without any time limit. However, the military continued to guard around the mine, to ensure that scavengers handed over all their jade to the regular dealers.

The locally patrolling troops must have noticed the signs of instability at the edge of the Gwihka Mine, but made no attempt to stop the scavengers from entering the mine.

In the last week of June there was non-stop heavy rainfall, causing growing fears among Gwihka locals that the mine would collapse. At 6 am on the morning of July 2, a local headman went to inspect the mining area, fearing collapse, but saw nothing and returned home. Suddenly, at 8 am, the entire northern edge of the mine collapsed, dislodging the water in the lake at the bottom of the mine. A giant wave of water, mud and rock swept across the mine floor, burying hundreds of scavengers already searching for jade since early that morning.

One of the scavengers who was lucky enough to escape, described his experience:

“At 5 am I went off to mine jade with two of my friends. We were using picks to dig for jade. There were about 1,000 people also looking for jade (in the Gwihka Mine). There were three entrance gates to the mining area, in the west, east and south. We didn’t think there was much danger. Even if a landslide happened, we thought it would take place at the Maw Tawng side (elsewhere in Gwihka) and we would not be affected. Suddenly there was a huge landslide. When it started falling, I tried to run to higher ground, but the waves were so strong I was sucked under. I was under the water for about ten minutes. I was praying all the time. I still have my parents and I need to take care of them. I managed to survive from being battered under the mud and water. My two friends also survived. I was naked because my clothes were pulled off by the mud and water. My phone and all my possessions were lost. There were some warning posts on the mining waste piles (outside the mine) but none in the mine or where the landslide happened. Because of this experience, I will be much more careful next time.”³


On the same day as the disaster, local rescue teams recovered 162 bodies. 54 injured scavengers were taken for treatment at the Hpakant Hospital.

Over the next few days more bodies were recovered, bringing the official death toll up to 172. However, locals estimate that about 100 more scavengers were killed, but remain buried under the mud.

On July 3, most of the dead were buried in a mass grave near the site of the disaster.

Most of those who died were migrant workers in their 20s and 30s from central Burma and Rakhine State, but some were local Kachin, including youth, saving up for their studies and their future.

³Survivor interviewed by KWAT on July 10, 2020



Landscape around the Gwihka Mine after the landslide on July 2, 2020

The mother of a local Kachin youth who perished in the landslide, described her son:

“I have only one son and one daughter. Only that morning he went there (to the Gwihka Mine), after not going to the mines all year. I was placing all my hopes on him for the future. Our family members stay at a relative’s house because we don’t have a house. So as an adult, he wanted the family to live well by his ability. He said, “Mom, I will try very hard. Perhaps, due to COVID 19, we cannot do any work.” Even while I was warning, “Don’t go, don’t go there,” it happened. He was serving at Jan Mai Buga Church and so many youth and youth leaders know him very well. I saw on his Facebook he said, “If I get profit from jade, all the profit will be for the church and my nation.” He was so kind and helpful, and very pious.”⁴

⁴Interview by KWAT on July 27, 2020

Another woman (who had come from Nbapa IDP camp to scavenge for jade in Gwihka) also lose her brother in law:

“My sister’s husband also died in that landslide. He was very kind and helpful. He worked hard to be able to raise his children. He was staying at Nba Pa IDP camp because he couldn’t live in his village. I am very upset because I called him here (to Gwihka) and now he has died. He has five children.”

Token government response

The official response to the disaster has so far only been token and lacking in transparency.

The day after the disaster, the President announced that a committee had been set up to investigate the incident. However, the six-member body includes a high-ranking military officer -- Union Home Minister Lt. Gen. Soe Htut, who has shares in the military-owned Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), which is heavily invested in the jade industry.

On July 5, the investigation body went to visit the site of the incident, and provided compensation to some of the victims, but at minimal rates. According to Gwihka authorities, the Union government has provided only K2,900,000 (2,188 USD) for each family of the deceased and K200,000 (150 USD) for each person who was injured, while the Kachin State government has provided K100,000 (75 USD) for each victim, deceased or injured.

Meanwhile, scapegoats were being found, but only at the local level, and without transparency. On July 7, the New Light of Myanmar reported that the Burma Army had “filed charges against officials responsible for security measures in mining sites near Wheyhka village” and that two military officials, the Kachin State Minister for Border and Security Affairs, Colonel Nay Lin Htun, and an another unnamed military officer, had been “re-called to their military duties since July 3.”

To this day, no one knows the identity of the military officer who has allegedly been recalled. ID 33 remains in charge of security in Hpakant.

On July 13, 2020, the media reported that 13 bosses (“laopan”) of the scavengers at the Gwihka Mine would be charged under Article 50 (A) of the Gemstone Law. Three people have so far been arrested, two men and one woman, and face sentences of up to three years in prison. They are being detained in a jail in Hpakant, and have not been allowed to see any family members.

Conclusion and recommendations

As the entity tasked with security and law enforcement at the Gwihka Mine, the Burma Army bears direct responsibility for the tragic loss of life in the landslide on July 2. Their troops were guarding the mine closely, but failed to enforce any safety regulations while the companies were operating, and made no attempt to block access to the mine when there were imminent signs of collapse.

The reason why the troops did not protect the lives of those working in the mines is because their sole function was to protect the jade, and ensure that the military collected their share of profits from it.

The fact that the troops guarding the mines were from ID 33 -- notorious for mass atrocities against civilians -- makes the military's priorities crystal clear.

The recent disaster in Gwihka is only the latest in a series of deadly mine collapses in Hpakant in past years, all under the military's watch, and despite the NLD's claims to be tightening regulation of the mining industry.

It is clear that mere reform of the mining sector will not prevent such disasters until there is radical structural political reform, and an end to the Burma Army's constitutional stranglehold on power.

KWAT therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. The Burma Army must end their offensives throughout the country, shut down their bases and withdraw troops from ethnic areas, including Hpakant, so that inclusive political dialogue towards a new federal democratic constitution, including security sector reform, can begin.
2. The Burma government must impose a moratorium on all mechanized mining and other large-scale resource extraction projects in ethnic areas until there is genuine peace and federal devolution of power, giving local communities ownership, management and control of their lands and resources – under the protection of a locally accountable security apparatus.
3. All mining companies must close down their operations in Hpakant and pull out all machinery, and the Burma government must ensure that these companies take responsibility for the environmental and social impacts of their mining activities. This must include restoring the landscape as much as possible to its original state, to address residual land instability, flooding and erosion, as well as providing proper compensation to locally impacted communities.
4. The Burma government must provide proper compensation to the families of all those killed in the July 2 landslide.
5. Charges against the 13 people accused of being “bosses” of the scavengers should be dropped, and the three in detention should be released immediately, as they have simply been made scapegoats.
6. Government authorities and security forces must immediately end harassment and threats against local communities in Hpakant who are defending their rights.

Appendix

List of companies with government mining permits in Gwihka in 2020

(according to information obtained in 2018 by Greenland Environmental Conservation Group)

Company Name	Company Owner	Mine (block no.)	Permit expiry date
Ayeyar Yadana	U Zaw Bo Hkant	Gwihka (106)	27 Jan 2020
Chaung Hpaya Tha	U Kyaw Sein	Gwihka – Maw Thit (443, 444)	3 Feb 2020
Kyauk Sein Thakin	U Maung Byone	Gwihka (284 – 287)	5 Feb 2020
Myanmar Kyauk Sein Lou' Ngan In Ar Su	U Kyaw Thu	Gwihka (431-434)	22 Mar 2020
Jadeland	U Khangda Brang Shawng	Gwihka (4)	7 Apr 2020
Yan Dragon	U Kyan Shaw Pan	Gwihka - Sawbwa Chaung (465)	8 Apr 2020
Ayeyar Yadana	U Soe Win	Gwihka (344)	10 Jun 2020
		Gwihka (345)	11 Jun 2020
		Gwihka (19)	19 Jun 2020
		Gwihka (58)	24 Jun 2020
Saing In Wain	U Karing Tu Mai	Gwihka – Maw Thit Kone (59)	10 Jun 2020
Hole in One	U Myo Kyi	Gwihka – Maw Thit Kone (317, 319, 320, 321)	10 Jun 2020
Hole in One	Daw Law Sone	Gwihka – Maw Thit Kone (322-326)	10 Jun 2020
Hole in One	Daw Yan Sham Yone	Gwihka – Maw Thit Kone (327-331)	10 Jun 2020
Yadana Kye	U Kyaw Naing	Gwihka (332-340)	11 Jun 2020
Yan Dragon	U Kyan Shaw Pan	Gwihka – Ka Hton Yab (350)	11 Jun 2020
Kyauk Sein Thakin	U Htun Win	Gwihka – Ka Hton Yab (423, 424)	22 Jul 2020
Yan Dragon	U Kyan Shaw Pan	Gwihka (426)	1 Aug 2020
Kyauk Sein Bone Saung Khe Nan Daw	U Aik Hla	Gwihka (56)	3 Aug 2020
Du Naing Me Myanmar Kyauk Sein	Daw Lu Tawng	Gwihka (815-817)	14 Sep 2020
Tun Shwe Yi	U Htun Win	Gwihka (80)	8 Oct 2020

Dae Da Lin	U Aung Myat	Gwihka – Sawbwa Chaung (85)	21 Oct 2020
Ayeyar Yadana	U Soe Win	Gwihka (814)	27 Oct 2020
Ne Kya Yadana	U Htin Kyaw	Gwihka (44)	31 Oct 2020
Su Du Pan	U Kyaw Htay	Gwihka (446, 447)	23 Nov 2020
Bu Ga	U Karang La Tawng	Gwihka (2, 3)	26 Nov 2020
Shwe Wa Mye	Daw Nan Aye Htun	Gwihka – Maw Thit Kone (346-349)	8 Nov 2020
Ayeyar Yadana	U Soe Win	Gwihka (11, 34, 43)	4 Dec 2020

List of jade scavengers whose bodies were recovered and identified from the July 2 landslide

No.	Gender	Age	ID (where available)	Ethnicity and Religion	Address
1.	Male	37	-	Burmese / Buddhist	Quarter (2), Gwihka
2.	Male	20	9/YaMaTa (N) 232706	Burmese / Buddhist	Quarter (2), Maw Thit Kung
3.	Male	20	9/YaMaTa(N) 223027	Burmese / Buddhist	Quarter (4), Maw Thit Kung
4.	Male	19	-	Kachin/ Christian	Quarter (4), Gwihka
5.	Male	23	5/ YaMaPa (N) 096792	Burmese	Quarter (3), Gwihka
6.	Male	40	1/MaSaNa(N) 052378	Kachin/ Christian	Quarter (6), Gwihka
7.	Male	22	1/MaKaNa(N) 215720	Kachin/ Christian	Quarter (6), Gwihka
8.	Male	45	13/NaHkaNa(N)008159	Kachin/ Christian	Quarter (6) Gwihka
9.	Male	22	-	Kachin/ Christian	-
10.	Male	30	-	Burmese	Quarter (3), Gwihka
11.	Male	23	-	Rakhine	-
12.	Male	26	9/ SaKaNa (N) 083297	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Gwihka
13.	Male	22	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Gwihka
14.	Male	30	11/ KaTaNa (N) 118849	Rakhine	Quarter (6) Gwihka

15.	Male	26	-	Rakhine	Jam Ga
16.	Male	26	-	Rakhine	Jam Ga
17.	Male	36	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3), Jam Ga
18.	Male	29	-	Rakhine	Maw Tawng
19.	Male	26	-	Rakhine	Maw Tawng
20.	Male	32	-	Rakhine	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
21.	Male	35	-	Rakhine	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
22.	Male	-	8/TaLaNa (N) 047884	Rakhine	Makarpin
23.	Male	20	5/TaLaNa (N) 176546	-	Makarpin
24.	Male	30	-	-	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
25.	Male	22	-	-	Quarter (2) Jam Ga
26.	Male	21	1/ MaKaNa(N) 065520	Kachin	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
27.	Male	39	-	Kachin	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
28.	Male	31	1/MaNyaNa(N) 036853	Burmese/ Buddhist	Quarter (4) Makarpin
29.	Male	43	5/TaSaNa(N) 082429	-	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
30.	Male	22	-	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
31.	Male	32	-	Rakhine	Maw Wan Lay
32.	Male	37	-	Kachin	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
33.	Male	24	-	Kachin	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
34.	Male	22	-	Myo	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
35.	Male	19	-	Myo	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
36.	Male	20	-	Kachin	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
37.	Male	41	-	Kachin	Jam Ga
38.	Male	21	11/PaTaNa(N) 138895	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng

39.	Male	28	-	Rakhine	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
40.	Male	26	-	Lisu	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
41.	Male	28	-	Kachin	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
42.	Male	27	-	Lisu	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
43.	Male	45	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
44.	Male	24	-	Burmese	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
45.	Male	21	1/ MaNyaNa (N) 194760	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
46.	Male	27	1/MaNyaNa (N) 161595	Shan+Burmese	Maw Galung
47.	Male	27	1/MaNyaNa(N) 136317	Shan+Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
48.	Male	-		-Kachin	Quarter (5) Electric office
49.	Male	27	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
50.	Male	29	-	Rakhine/ Buddhist	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
51.	Male	21	9/ WaKaNa(N) 094462	Rakhine/ Buddhist	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
52.	Male	23	-	Kachin	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
53.	Male	47	14/DaDaYa(N) 101235	Burmese/ Buddhist	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
54.	Male	30	-	Rakhine/ Buddish	Quarter (3) Hka Chyang
55.	Male	21	-	Rakhine/ Buddish	Quarter (3) Hka Chyant
56.	Male	31	14/DaDaYa (N) 128206	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
57.	Male	23	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
58.	Male	25	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka

59.	Male	32	-	Burmese	Pale Kawng
60.	Male	38	-	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
61.	Male	36	14/ DaDaYa(N) 132035	Burmese/ Buddhist	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
62.	Male	19	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
63.	Male	46	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
64.	Male	31	-	Rakhine	Hka Chyang
65.	Male	28	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
66.	Male	35	5/KaLaWa (N) 000324	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
67.	Male	23	5/YaMaPa (N) 128212	Burmese/ Buddhist	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
68.	Male	25	-	Karen	-
69.	Male	35	5/ KaLaTa (N) 091881	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
70.	Male	28	-	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
71.	Male	40	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
72.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
73.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
74.	Male	29	-	Rakhine	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
75.	Male	32	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
76.	Male	30	8/ GaGaNa(N) 095947	Burmese	Quarter (4) Mawtit Kung
77.	Male	34	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Mawtit Kung
78.	Male	29	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Mawtit Kung
79.	Male	31	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Mawtit Kung
80.	Male	28	-	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka

81.	Male	40	-	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
82.	Male	-	-	Rakhine	
83.	Male	27	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
84.	Male	21	5/ MaKaTa(N) 081116	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
85.	Male	28	5/ YaMaPa(N) 139169	Burmese	-
86.	Male	50	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
87.	Male	32	5/YaMaPa (N) 011024	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
88.	Male	29	5/ YaMaPa (N) 026925	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
89.	Male	25	-	Rakhine	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
90.	Male	60	-	Rakhine	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
91.	Male	30	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
92.	Male	-	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
93.	Male	21	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Hka Chyang
94.	Male	26	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
95.	Male	24	-	Burmese	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
96.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
97.	Male	25	-	Rakhine	Hka Chyang
98.	Male	17	-	Rakhine	Hka Chyang
99.	Male	24	-	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
100.	Male	42	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
101.	Male	27	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
102.	Male	23	-	Burmese	Jam Ga
103.	Male	-	-	Burmese	Gwihka
104.	Male	33	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
105.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka


106.	Male	26	-	Burmese	Quarter (1) Maw Tawng
107.	Male	47	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
108.	Male	29	-	Rakhine	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
109.	Male	29	-	Burmese	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
110.	Male	20	11/ KaTaNa(N) 143414	Rakhine	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
111.	Male	24	11/ SaTaNa(N) 130485	Rakhine	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
112.	Male	33	-	Burmese	Makarpin
113.	Male	35	-	Rakhine	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
114.	Male	27	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
115.	Male	30	-	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
116.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
117.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
118.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
119.	Male	26	-	Rakhine	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
120.	Male	25	-	Rakhine	Gwi-hka
121.	Male	24	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
122.	Male	29	-	Burmese	Quarter (6) Gwi-hka
123.	Male	40	-	Shan	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
124.	Male	32	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
125.	Male	36	-	Rakhine	Makarpin
126.	Male	18	-	Rakhine	Makarpin
127.	Male	32	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka

128.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (4) Gwi-hka
129.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
130.	Male	22	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
131.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
132.	Male	22	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
133.	Male	42	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
134.	Male	20	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
135.	Male	35	1/ KaPaNa(N) 070808	Rakhine	Quarter (4) Jam Ga
136.	Male	24	-	Burmese/Buddhist	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
137.	Male	24	-	Kachin	Quarter (1) Gwi-hka
138.	Male	21	-	Kachin	Quarter (1) Gwi-hka
139.	Male	29	-		Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
140.	Male	24	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
141.	Male	22	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Jam Ga
142.	Male	25	-	Rakhine	Quarter (3) Gwi-hka
143.	Male	25	-	Burmese	Quarter (3) Maw Tawng
144.	Male	28	-	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
145.	Male	28	-	Shan/Burmese	Quarter (3) Jam Ga
146.	Mae	25	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
147.	Male	21	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
148.	Male	32	-	Rakhine	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng

149.	Male	27	-	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka
150.	Male	28	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Jam Ga
151.	Male	33	-	Rakhine	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
152.	Male	21	-	Rakhine	Quarter (5) Gwi-hka
153.	Male	35	5/ PaLaNa(N) 079980	Burmese	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
154.	Male	26	-	Rakhine	Jam Ga
155.	Male	18	-	Shan/ Buddhist	Quarter (3) Hka Chyang
156.	Male	-	1/ MaNyaNa (N) 066228	Burmese/ Buddhist	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
157.	Male	30	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
158.	Male	22	-	Burmese	Quarter (2) Gwi-hka
159.	Male	40	-	Shan/ Buddhist	Quarter (3) Hka Chyang
160.	Male	37	5/ YaUNa(N) 086101	Burmese	Quarter (2) Maw Tawng
161.	Male	24	5/ MaKaNa(N) 088892	Burmese	Quarter (7) Gwi-hka

Kachin Women's Association Thailand (KWAT)

KWAT was formed in Chiang Mai, Thailand on September 9, 1999 based on the urgent need for women to solve their own problems following the increased number of Kachin people fleeing the deteriorating political, economic and social situation in Burma. KWAT envisions that all forms of discrimination are eliminated in Kachin State; all women are empowered to participate in decision making at the local, national and international levels; and all Kachin children have the opportunity to fulfil their potential. KWAT advocates at the national and international levels to raise awareness about the human rights and political situation in Burma.



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